No one wants to talk about the major nuclear risk in Ukraine, which has increased once again with the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam – many are too entangled and the European nuclear discussion is too canted.

The blowing up of the Kakhovka dam with its large hydroelectric power plant will have devastating consequences for the areas in the south of Ukraine, even after the floods have subsided. Filling the reservoir particularly high, then blowing up the dam, providing no help in the occupied territories and taking fire at rescue operations of Ukrainians and flooded cities – this is evidence of Russian warfare without taboos.

The destruction of the dam also has consequences for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP). With six reactors, it is the largest in Europe. While the occupation of the Chornobyl exclusion zone was abandoned when the Russian advance on Kyiv failed, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was attacked and has been occupied for 16 months. Thousands of residents of the city of Enerhodar, who gathered around the NPP as human shields, were unable to stop this war crime.

Bomb on reactor roof

The situation was always critical even before the Kakhovka Dam was blown up. Buildings on the site were hit during attacks and during the conquest. A bomb was found on a reactor roof. According to eyewitnesses, the Russian army uses the nuclear power plant to store equipment and is even said to have set up defensive positions on reactor roofs and mined parts of the facilities. Russian attacks on the Ukrainian power grid have already interrupted the power supply to Zaporizhzhia seven times. Until now, the supply of cooling water was from a cooling water basin supplied by the Kakhovka reservoir. In an emergency, it would be possible to pump water for cooling directly from the Dnipro. For this, however, the riverbank would have to be cleared of mines with the consent of the Russian army.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not see any acute risk in an initial reaction to the dam being blown up. However, the situation was deemed to be so risky that IAEA head Manuel Grossi himself travelled to Ukraine and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. After the visit, he now affirmed that the IAEA was trying everything to prevent a nuclear accident. Crucial questions and demands of the Ukrainian government and the nuclear regulator remained unanswered. It is not clear whether the IAEA had access to all parts of the nuclear power plant, whether the IAEA checked the positions of the Russian army, the weapons caches or the mining of facilities of the nuclear power plant and on the banks of the river. Most importantly, the IAEA has again failed to ensure that the NPP is returned to Ukrainian responsibility and that the requirements of the Ukrainian nuclear regulator are followed. Although the supply of electricity is not continuous and of water is only temporary, one of the reactors is not yet in cold shutdown as required by Ukraine.

Even before the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, the staff of the nuclear power plant worked under extraordinary stress. Since the beginning of the Russian occupation, working conditions have not met the minimum requirements for safe operation. Threats and coercive measures, including cases of detention and torture by the Russian occupiers, have been reported time and again. The IAEA does not seem to have any influence on this either.

Permanent power supply not guaranteed

While the Zaporizhzhia NPP was a recurring topic of public debate even before the flood, there was hardly any attention paid to the other Ukrainian nuclear power plants under the conditions of war. The three NPPs Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Ukraine South near Mykolaiv, with their total of nine units, were and are directly and indirectly at risk due to the ongoing Russian air attacks. Only recently, Russian missiles were intercepted not far from Khmelnytskyi. A permanently secured power supply, a prerequisite for the safe operation of nuclear power plants, is not guaranteed due to the destruction of a large part of the conventional power plant park and the pipeline systems. After one of the severe area-wide Russian attacks on the energy system, all Ukrainian nuclear power plants were without regular supply.

Due to the targeted destruction of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, the risks of operating nuclear power plants are growing. However, Ukraine – this is the additional problem – cannot do without reactors after the destruction of many conventional power plants and with 50 percent dependence on nuclear power.

Nuclear power plants are like pre-installed bombs, a gift for terrorists, was the title of a text by nuclear expert Mycle Schneider a few years ago. In times when a nuclear power invades a neighbouring country and includes its nuclear facilities in its warfare, this exaggeration gives new food for thought. After 9/11, air defence was set up in France at Cap La Hague around the nuclear reprocessing plant.

Today, Ukraine must be given everything it needs to protect its NPPs. It is good that the reluctance to supply air defence systems to the Ukrainian army has been abandoned and that in the meantime the delivery of F16s and other combat aircraft is at least being prepared. Protecting the airspace over Ukraine is also a measure against the everyday nuclear threat.

Not a technology of the future

In Germany and other EU countries, much is said in praise of France’s energy industry. Surprisingly, the many technical problems of the French nuclear power plants and their great dependence on Russia remain underexposed. This is one of the reasons why there are still no sanctions against the Russian nuclear company Rosatom. Yet the company, as part of the operating team, is involved in the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and thus in a war crime.

“Atoms for Peace”, the slogan under which the IAEA and Manuel Grossi work for a future of nuclear power, has always been window dressing. Russia, which continues to have its place on the IAEA’s Board of Governors as a matter of course, is once again exposing it as the organisation’s life lie. Russia is systematically making safe operations more difficult, militarizing the Ukrainian nuclear power plants and deliberately risking a major nuclear accident. Grossi’s new mission cannot hide this.

The new debate on nuclear power gives a wide berth to the situation in Ukraine. It seems to us to be anything but advisable to bet anew on this high-risk technology in a world that is becoming more confrontational and unpeaceful.

Authors:

VICTORIA VOYTSITSKA director of Advocacy in the Energy Sector at the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory (ICUV), Member of Parliament of the 8th Convocation, Secretary of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety.

REBECCA HARMS is an expert on Ukraine and nuclear power. She was a member of the European Parliament and leader of the Green Party for many years.

for Taz.Futurzwei