ON TRACK TO THE MEMBERSHIP?

For decades, Russia has been using intimidation, blackmail and war as foreign policy tools. Neither growing economic interdependence with Europe nor the attempted diplomatic rapprochement nor appeasement succeeded in making Russia peaceful and democratic. On the contrary, lack of accountability for its wars, including against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 paved the way for the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Now Russia’s current war of conquest, the largest since WWII, puts the world at the crossroads. Either the international order will be restored by stopping and holding to account the aggressor, or last century’s practices of changing independent states’ borders by force will become a new normal.

Returning sustainable peace to Europe requires changing policies, previously proved ineffective. This includes the need to disregard Russia’s de-facto veto on NATO enlargement that instead of deterring has emboldened it. The integration of Ukraine to NATO has been a hostage of the policy of non-provoking Russia for too long, depriving both of a mutually beneficial alliance.

NEUTRALITY AND APPEASEMENT EMBOLDEN AGGRESSORS

Building strong relations requires efforts from both sides. This was missing between Ukraine and NATO before the Russian aggression in 2014. Ukraine’s steps towards NATO were undermined by massive Russian propaganda domestically. Simultaneously, NATO member states were mostly focusing on integrating the Central European and Baltic states, leaving Ukraine on the periphery and prioritizing Russia’s opinion over Ukraine’s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Ukraine sought its place in the security architecture. On one hand, it looked for external security guarantees including through the integration into various institutions. Ukraine committed to give up the third biggest nuclear arsenal in 1994 under pressure from the US and Russia. On the other hand, it was limited by intentions to become a neutral country, embedded into the 1990 Declaration of Independence, despite that the neutral status was never mentioned in the Constitution of Ukraine.

Russia struggled to let independent Ukraine go. Tensions included the status of Crimea and the port of Sevastopol, the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the demarcation of borders. Russia constantly used political and economic means, threats and disinformation against Ukraine.

In 1992, Ukraine started to cooperate with NATO. In 1994 it joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace and in 1997 the Charter on Distinctive Partnership was signed. In 2002 President Kuchma officially announced Ukraine’s intentions to seek NATO membership, which was reversed to deep cooperation with NATO in 2004.

Domestically, an aggressive anti-NATO propaganda brainwashed Ukrainian society. NATO’s image fell victim to the post-Cold war fear-mongering and attacks by Russian-paid politicians, like Natalia Vitrenko or Viktor Yanukovych. In 2006, the Communist Party announced the establishment of the “Anti-NATO caucus” in the Parliament, and Viktor Medvedchuk’s party pushed for a referendum. The state did little to raise awareness about NATO.

At that time, NATO was focused on building a predictable partnership with Russia. In 2002 NATO-Russia Council was established to serve as a forum for consultation, cooperation and joint decision-making where Russia had an equal seat. Ukraine only received this format at the recent Vilnius Summit. 

In 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, responding to a joint request of Ukraine’s President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Speaker Yatseniuk, German and French governments blocked granting Ukraine the Membership Action Plan. Allies vaguely agreed that Ukraine will become a member of NATO with the MAP being the next step on the way. In the following years, NATO failed to deliver on the pledge, adding to a fertile soil for skepticism in Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was largely misinterpreted in the West. It strengthened their hesitancy to get closer with both aspiring countries, instead, opening them to reload the relationship with Russia. That included the 2009 “reset” by Obama’s administration, as well as 2010 NATO’s strategic concept, where the Alliance aimed for a true strategic partnership with Russia. The idea of a missile defense system “one security roof” from Vancouver to Vladivostok was discussed. These attempts to appease the already aggressive behavior of Russia have only reassured it of the success of its course.

Western partners failed to realize the strategic value of Ukraine, preferring to accept the Russian de-facto veto on NATO enlargement. Creating a positive image of NATO in Ukraine and helping with the country’s democratic transformation was never a priority then. The illusion that non-alignment can provide security was further entrenched among Ukrainians. Consequently, there was no major outcry in the society when the Parliament under Yanukovych’s presidency adopted the law in 2010, which defined Ukraine’s non-bloc status.

In February 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine despite its neutrality and a record-low level of support for NATO. The policy of non-provocation and appeasement towards Russia led both by NATO and Ukraine proved to be a failure.

RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

2014-2022 marked a new era of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, still short on real integration. 

Russia’s military aggression changed public opinion in Ukraine. The support of membership in NATO increased by 2,5 times from 18% to 47,8% in 2014 compared to 2013. The full-scale war increased the figure to 83%. 

The Revolution of Dignity galvanized public demand for justice and democratization. The country started an ambitious reform agenda aimed at tackling corruption, ensuring transparency, streamlining public services, introducing civic oversight, cleaning the judiciary and banking system etc. In February 2019, the Parliament embedded Ukraine’s Euro and Euroatlantic integration into the Constitution. 

NATO significantly increased its support to Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance Package, several Trust Funds and capacity-building initiatives. In 2015 NATO’s presence in Ukraine was upgraded to opening of the NATO Representation to Ukraine. 

Ukraine had a plan of military-to-military cooperation with NATO, as well as bilateral training missions from the US, UK, Canada and Lithuania. It regularly participated in joint multilateral exercises with NATO and hosted them. Yet there was a constant refusal to provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine to avoid an escalation that was only changed with a decision on Javelin anti-tank missiles by the US in 2018. In 2020, Ukraine received an Enhanced Opportunity Partner status, which provided preferential access to NATO’s interoperability toolbox, including exercises, training, exchange of information and situational awareness. 

In 2023, at the Vilnius Summit, the Allies removed MAP as a condition for NATO membership, but did not grant Ukraine the political invitation and failed to define Ukraine’s Euroatlantic path.

CAN’T AFFORD REPEATING PREVIOUS MISTAKES

There are two basic scenarios for further Ukraine-NATO relations: integration and non-integration.

Integrating Ukraine will mean delivering to Russia a message that a sovereign nation is free to choose where it belongs and that the spheres of influence are left in the past forever. It will focus on what is best for NATO and Ukraine and will deter future Russian acts of aggression.

For Ukraine, NATO membership is the only cost-effective sustainable security guarantee which goes hand in hand with the strengthening of democracy and internal reforms, demanded by Ukrainians. NATO has practical tools to speed up the reforming of Ukraine’s security and defense sectors. During the accession talks, NATO will be able to engage more as a reform advocate in Ukraine.

Given the scope of the recovery efforts after the war, NATO membership is the only credible guarantee for investors to take part in Ukraine’s recovery in the mid- and long-term. Who would otherwise invest knowing that their factories could be destroyed soon?

The benefits of integration for NATO are often undervalued. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept mentions Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” Ukraine is the only country that has direct combat experience in repelling the Russian invasion. That is an asset for the development of new doctrines, exercises and trainings for NATO. In numbers, Ukraine has the largest army in Europe which will strengthen the Alliance’s military capacity, establishing a NATO forward defensive line and bolstering the safety of the Central and Eastern Europe states. Moreover, Ukraine has already proved to be a reliable contributor to transatlantic security, having taken part in all major NATO-led missions earlier. 

By now, 25 NATO Allies have already signed declarations supporting Ukraine’s future accession to NATO.

Integration can and should begin before the war ends, that would not drag the Alliance in the fighting. There is a long procedure between the invitation and full membership, and Article 5 applies only to members. By the time Ukraine actually becomes a NATO member, it will have opportunities to regain control over its territory. Moreover, the West German experience shows that when NATO mobilses political will, it can find a way to integrate a country. In fact, the Federal Republic was able to join the Alliance in 1955 while still being stuck in a territorial conflict.

NATO dragging its feet from getting closer with Ukraine will send Russia a signal of weakness. Ironically, by trying to avoid escalation at any cost, allies are greenlighting further aggression not only against Ukraine, but other states, which Russia considers to be its sphere of influence. Some of them are already part of NATO.

The scenario of non-integration would require Ukraine to seek for other credible deterrence options, massive and costly, like further militarisation of Ukrainian society and the efforts to cover the entire Ukraine with air defense systems. Part of those costs would lie on the shoulders of the Allies too, as well as their own defense spendings will grow.

Lack of effective security guarantees will contribute to Russia’s long-term aim to depopulate Ukraine. In 1,5 years of the full-scale invasion, the number of refugees exceeds 6.29 million people as reported by the UNHCR. These are mostly women and kids. According to the UN survey, 65% of respondents plan to return to Ukraine “some day”.

With Ukraine having the largest combat-experienced army in Europe, overwhelming people’s will to integrate into NATO, geography, democracy and rule of law reforms on track, there are no real arguments against the immediate start of Ukraine’s integration in NATO except fear. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg recently said, “I understand the concerns that our support of Ukraine carries the risk of escalation, but the risk pales in comparison to allowing Putin to win this war.” Indeed, Putin should lose this war. Ukrainian accession to NATO will become one of the pillars of sustainable peace in Europe.