1. Legality Concerns

De Wever’s Argument: “Is it legal at least? It is a stretch… Nobody has ever done this before.”

Counterpoint:

• Since 2022, leading international law experts have confirmed that using frozen Russian state assets as a countermeasure is legitimate under customary international law (Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts — ARSIWA).
• Similar measures had never been applied before, yet novel countermeasures are lawful when proportional and temporary.
• Most international courts, except for some investment tribunals, lack jurisdiction over disputes with Russia or its Central Bank.

First of all, yes it is indeed legal. Since 2022 prominent world experts on international law have substantially grounded that use of frozen Russian assets would be a legitimate countermeasure according to the rules of the international customary law, aggregated in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) applied based on the fact that Russia fails to fulfill its obligations as violator and aggressor: stop the aggression and compensate for losses. Indeed, the measures of such kind have never been applied but the same could be said about  many kinds of countermeasures before they were successfully applied. At least, use of Russian state assets  may successfully comply with all the requirements and criteria of countermeasures including proportionality and temporality (as used or confiscated amount may successfully be netted from the general number of reparations due to payment by the Russian Federation). At the same time based on the numerous comprehensive analyses, the absolute majority of international courts (except for investment tribunals) hardly even have jurisdiction to consider disputes with Russia or Russian Central Bank.  

2. Debunking the myth that using Russian assets is impossible: the EU itself created the precedents. 3. Risk Exposure / Liability

When it comes to protecting investors of the EU depositories and businesses at the expense of Russian assets, Belgium, Euroclear, and the EU in general have already demonstrated remarkable flexibility and willingness to take risks, even in legally and financially questionable circumstances, pertaining to confiscation of Russian private assets. 

• In December 2024, amendments to the EU CFSP decisions and corresponding regulations allowed the use of cash balances attributable to the Russian National Securities Depository and other sanctioned Russian entities to compensate European CSDs’ investors for losses caused by Russia’s hostile actions. In July 2025, the Council decided to prohibit the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and court decisions in the EU related to investor–state disputes over such EU measures.

3. The reparations-backed loan is a key to bringing a sustainable peace closer.

Putin is openly declaring that he has no intention of engaging in any genuine peace negotiations or making any concessions, because he has no incentive to stop the aggression. Russia’s war machine is operating at full capacity, and it is impossible to quickly shift its economy back to peacetime — which makes the continuation of the war strategically advantageous for him.

Moreover, Putin is counting on “outlasting” Western assistance — the depletion of Ukraine’s resources and Europe’s fatigue are central elements of his strategy. A two-year, predictable financing package backed by frozen Russian assets completely breaks this plan, depriving the Kremlin of the illusion that it can simply wait for support to collapse.

A stronger Ukrainian defence, funded through the reparations-backed loan, will force Russia to take peace seriously and work on an actual peace plan rather than a list of demands. Only when Ukraine has the resources to deter Russia for another two years will the Kremlin be compelled to seriously consider the conditions for a just peace rather than pushing pseudo-negotiations and manipulation.
Therefore, the mechanism for using frozen Russian assets makes the war more costly for Russia and accelerates the emergence of real conditions for peace.

4. Risk Exposure / Liability

De Wever’s Argument: “Taking Putin’s money and leaving the risks with us. That’s not going to happen.”

Counterpoint:

• Analysis shows investment tribunal risks are extremely low. Bilateral Investment Treaties (e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Soviet Union 1989 BIT) provide general language but the Central Bank of Russia’s chances of winning a claim are minimal.
• EU measures (2024–2025) already protect against potential claims and set precedent for using frozen assets legally.
• The Reparations Loan is structured so Ukraine repays only after receiving compensation from Russia — no additional risk to Member States.

As for the fears of De Wever of risks of being defeated in the investment tribunal, they are not actually based on real arguments and researches, just plain suggestions. 

First of all the 1989 BIT between Belgium & Luxembourg (BLEU) on the one side and Soviet Union on another side (succeeded by Russia) indeed has very general and extensive language which may allow the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)  to be admitted to the dispute as ‘investor’ (but not for sure, as CBR is also a constitutional state authority). But talking on the merits of the possible case the chances  for the CBR to win are extremely low, based on the analysis of the related case law due to the following general reasons:

• The number of effective arbitration awards follow the general approach firstly established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the investment dispute should not be considered separately from the general international law. Therefore, violation by Russia of the peremptory rules of international law and role of CBR in Russian aggression shall be taken into account by the tribunal as well as actions with Russian assets in response; 
• Application of countermeasures is considered by the investment tribunals as “indeed available to responding States in international investment proceedings. A host State is entitled under general international law to react to another State’s breach of an international obligation by temporarily suspending its protection of the latter’s investors within its territory, in accordance with the requirements for a lawful countermeasure under customary international law”
• Analysis of the case law of the international investment tribunals provides that tribunals clearly differ compensable and non- compensable expropriation of property, which means that the state is not obliged to compensate the investor for the expropriated property if such procedure complies with the following criteria: whether the measure is within the recognized police powers of the host State; the (public) purpose and effect of the measure;whether the measure is discriminatory;the proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized;  bona fide nature of the measure. Considering this, possible use of Russian frozen assets may also be successfully grounded as a justified non-compensable expropriation normally used against the investor from the aggressor’s state. 

However, we may not but stress that all the arguments above are worth consideration just in case assets are actually taken, which is not a subject of the ‘reparation loan’ proposal. This proposal provides for Ukrainian funding backed by Ukraine’s rights for reparations and assets shall be used just as additional securing guarantee. 

Finally, the examples of existing investment claims from Fridman and others are not the same story as the frozen CBR assets and these risks have been even more extended by the EU’s own actions. For instance, in December 2024, amendments to the EU CFSP decisions and corresponding regulations allowed the use of cash balances attributable to the Russian National Securities Depository and other sanctioned Russian entities to compensate European CSDs’ investors for losses caused by Russia’s hostile actions. These decisive actions increased the risks of successful litigation by Russian in investment arbitrations as: 1. Russian individuals and companies may invoke human rights’ protection under European rules – which covers not only individuals but also non-governmental organizations (companies). This may not be applied by the CBR as a 100% governmental organization; 2. The connection between Russian individuals and companies with launch and conduct of the aggression is not so obvious, as in the

CBR’s case and would require detailed proof. However, these risks did not prevent Belgium and EU in general to impose such rules, unlike the CBR’s case. 

Also, in July 2025, the Council of the EU decided to prohibit the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and court decisions  in the EU related to investor–state disputes over such EU measures. Actually, this move is not so pure from the legal point of view (such provisions have never been elaborated before in a way they automatically block recognition and enforcement of any of such decisions). However, if they are already taken, why may something similar not be enacted with regard to the possible investment awards on CBR assets and eliminate arbitration risks?

5. Revenue / Tax Implications

De Wever’s View: He expressed relief at the prospect of disposing of the frozen funds.

Counterpoint:

• Frozen Russian assets can directly fund Ukraine, including military needs, without impacting Belgian taxpayers.
• Ursula von der Leyen’s proposals offer three viable financing options, with the Reparations Loan providing timely, concessional, and scaleable support linked to immobilized assets

6. Strategic Imperative

De Wever’s Concern: Belgium may face political backlash or be held liable.

Counterpoint:

• Ukraine’s financing gap for 2026–2027 exceeds EUR 135 billion, including military and state needs.
• Immediate and sufficient support is critical to maintain Ukraine’s defense, protect Europe, and pressure Russia to cease hostilities.
• Delaying support weakens Europe’s security, while the Reparations Loan allows rapid mobilization without increasing EU borrowing or Member States’ debt.

7. Trade and Geopolitical Risks

De Wever’s Argument: He frames potential use of assets as “transactionalism and imperialism” that could undermine Europe’s ability to engage with MERCOSUR, Asia, and Africa — the countries “that still like the rule of law and normal leadership.”

Counterpoint: Many of these countries have histories of dictatorship and economic ties with Russia, making De Wever’s framing inconsistent.

Supporting Ukraine strengthens Europe’s security and credibility without undermining trade relations.

In his speech Mr DeWever almost directly characterizes the possible decision on assets as a gesture of “transactionalism and imperialism” opposing it to the part of the world which “… still likes the rule of law and normal leadership…” referring before to the states of MERCOSUR, Asian and African states, a lot from which have a long history of dictatorship regimes and are within the sphere of Russian economic influence. 

Conclusion

While De Wever dramatizes Belgium’s exposure, the legal, financial, and political frameworks already mitigate most risks. Accepting the Reparations Loan is not only lawful but strategically essential for Ukraine and Europe. The EU must act decisively to provide predictable, timely, and scalable support.

Additionally, on 17 November, President von der Leyen circulated a letter outlining the three options the European Commission is currently considering to close Ukraine’s massive financing gap for 2026–2027. They include: (1) direct grants from Member States; (2) an EU-backed limited-recourse loan funded through Union borrowing; and (3) a limited-recourse loan backed by the cash balances of immobilised Russian sovereign assets.

Among these, the Reparations Loan clearly emerges as the most cost-effective and strategically sound option without placing overly pressure on national budgets of the Member States. From the three available choices, the Reparations Loan offers the cheapest, fastest, and most coherent path to ensuring Ukraine’s financial and defence resilience in 2026–2027.

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