US President Joe Biden and other Western leaders, even China, warned Russia against deploying nuclear weapons in their war against Ukraine. However, the international partners never drew a red line for using civil nuclear energy as a weapon that may cause a catastrophe at a Ukrainian nuclear power plant with a magnitude high enough to effect the entire European continent. This fact is proven by the lack of effective sanctions against Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom which implements unprecedented nuclear terrorism.

Despite the first case for sanctioning Rosatom was offered in April 19, 2022, by the international working group for sanctions against Russia (the Yermak-McFaul group), it was never included in any of the EU sanctions packages. Minor sanctions regarding agency officials were adopted by the UK and the US on February 24, 2023, but that is incomparable to the crimes they commit.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion back in February 2022, Russia conducted 871 missile attacks on Ukraine. They specifically targeted energy infrastructure to destabilize electricity supply and cause a full-scale blackout. Russia has been violating the basic principles of nuclear safety and security in Ukraine focusing its main military strategy on Ukrainian civil nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure providing integrity and safety of their operations.

Over a year ago, on March 4, 2022, Russia conducted an unprecedented act of nuclear terrorism in the history of humankind – the seizure of the largest nuclear power plant in Ukraine and Europe –Zaporizhzhia NPP. From the first days of the occupation, Rosatom employees were present at the plant. The site has endured fire, structural damage, and six temporary losses of all off-site power as the result of Russian shelling, and the grid connection still remains fragile. Russia has been torturing and killing ZNPP personnel, while Rosatom employees forced Ukrainian staff to sign contracts with the Russian agency. Although all six nuclear reactors at the ZNPP are now shut down, the fuel they contain still needs cooling to avoid a potentially catastrophic meltdown. All nuclear power plants need 24/7 electricity to pump water through their reactors’ core.

Therefore, when Russia intentionally targets electrical grid and its parts, including substations that connect a nuclear power plant with the grid, it facilitates a potential nuclear disaster in Europe, the most severe one since Chernobyl. If an NPP has no access to the grid due to renewed shelling, it will become completely reliable on emergency diesel generators, availability of diesel fuel, and proper functioning of all its critical elements.

In particular, on November 23, 2022, Russia launched an unprecedented attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. As a result, all four nuclear power plants were cut off the grid. Emergency diesel generators were providing the required electricity to maintain the security and safety of operations of the relevant NPPs. Two diesel generators on one of NPPs unfortunately malfunctioned. According to the Minister of Energy of Ukraine, “Russia risked causing a nuclear and radioactive catastrophe by launching attacks leading to disconnection of all Ukraine’s nuclear power plants from the power grid for the first time in 40 years.

On March 9, 2023, during another Russian missile strike which damaged the high-voltage transmission network, Zaporizhzhia NPP was cut out of incoming electricity supply again. IAEA Director General Mariano Grossi commented on the incident,

“…I want to report that this morning, at around 5 a.m. local time, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant lost all off-site power when its last remaining 750 kilovolt line was disconnected; its only operating back-up 330-kilovolt line having been damaged a few days ago and is currently under repair. As a result, all 20 of the site’s emergency diesel generators were activated… This is the first time the site has lost all power since November 23, 2022…

Yet again, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is running on emergency diesel – the last line of defense. This is the sixth time, let me say it again – the SIXTH time – that ZNPP has lost all off-site power and had to operate in this emergency mode… And if we allow this to repeat time after time, one day our luck will run out. I call on everyone in this room today and elsewhere – we must commit to protecting the safety and security of the plant. And we need to do it NOW.”

In addition to specifically targeting energy grid and its substations essential for the security and safety at the NPPs, Russia’s actions have also been causing a critical situation with the water supply for ZNPP cooling system.

The six-reactor ZNPP is situated near a water body that serves as its ultimate heat sink (UHS). It is crucial to have an assured supply of water to its “essential service water system” that enables removal of the radioactive decay heat from shutdown reactors and spent fuel pools. This water system is also used to cool the equipment such as the emergency diesel generators.

At Zaporizhzhia NPP, water supply for the UHS is secured by cooling ponds of the Kakhovka Reservoir located downstream of the plant on the Dnipro River. Russian forces controlling the reservoir dam have been draining its water that resulted in a decreased water level at ZNPP’s reservoirs. If the water level gets too low, the cooling ponds will not be naturally replenished, and the essential service water system will fail.

The overall situation at ZNPP remains highly risky: one pipe break, valve failure, or operator error could jeopardize the cooling of one or more of the shutdown cores or spent fuel pools – an event that would be accompanied by a loss of offsite power and/or the UHS.

Also, if the Kakhovka Reservoir level further decreases, it will require an adequate alternative water supply. Maintaining these alternative arrangements indefinitely would require an enormous effort by ZNPP’s personnel to operate all the equipment at six reactors manually – comparable or greater to what was needed at Fukushima in order to avert a major nuclear disaster.

In addition, Russia has not limited its attacks on Ukrainian civil nuclear assets to just NPPs and the related substations, which is proven by the following incidents:

• military strikes on radioactive source facility outside Kyiv and at Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology;
• seizure of Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant;
• Russia used the site as a staging ground for its attempt to capture Kyiv;
• in September 2022, a Russian missile damaged buildings at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant;
• in September 2022, Russian forces struck a radiological storage facility near Kharkiv.

Moreover, despite unprecedented Russian nuclear terrorism in Ukraine, various open sources reported about Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation, particularly the fact that Rosatom is providing highly enriched uranium for Chinese fast breeder reactors, said John F. Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, during a hearing at the U. S. House Armed Services Committee. “They may have talking points around it, but there’s no getting around the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is used for weapons.” This becomes a particular concern in the light of Chinese plans to triple their nuclear arsenal by 2035.

Russia’s pattern of disregard for Europe’s and global nuclear safety and security, it being an irresponsible supplier of nuclear power and civil nuclear technologies, and it conducting an unprecedented act of nuclear terrorism at ZNPP demands a common response of international scale. Therefore, the following steps are necessary to end Russian nuclear terrorism and incentivize Russian withdrawal from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant:

• cut a source of funding the export of Russian nuclear reactors around the world and ensure strategic decoupling from Rosatom: freeze all the existing projects with the participation of Rosatom or its affiliated companies or joint ventures until the complete cessation of the Russian aggression and the withdrawal of occupation troops from the territory of Ukraine and impose sanctions on companies and contractors involved in developing and constructing the new NPPs. It is important to promote more reputable and responsible alternatives to Russia’s commercial nuclear industry;
• certify an alternative fuel for the NPPs that run on Russian TVEL to be used at those NPPs that still depend on Russian fuel. Such a step will decrease the level of dependance of specific countries, including those in the EU, from Russian fuel and limit its influence on economic, energy, political, and overall security. Present the roadmap for the introduction of embargo on Russian uranium for the countries which are still importing it.

In addition, Russia continues to perplex the tactics of its missile and drone barrages, as well as diversify its striking capabilities. During one of the latest attacks on March 9, 2023, Russia launched 81 missiles and eight strike drones. It was the largest attack during the last months, and for the first time Russia used six hypersonic Kinzhal missiles. Ukrainian air defense (UAD) shot down or misdirected 42 missiles and four strike drones. They included four missiles that were shot down just 50 km from South Ukraine NPP. The total efficiency of missile interception by the UAD of 51 % on March 9, 2023, was lower than the average of previous month rate of 70.5 %. The energy and defense targets were hit in 13 regions of Ukraine. Therefore, as a part of the nuclear security strategy, it is also critically important to strengthen the country’s air defense by providing more air and missile defense systems, as well as F16 fighter jets.