

HOUSE OF LORDS

International Agreements Committee

8th Report of Session 2024–25

UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Agreement

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International Agreements Committee

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See Appendix 1.

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Summary	2
Agreement reported for Special Attention	3
Introduction	3
Background	5
The Agreement	5
The purpose and duration of the Agreement	6
Defence and security cooperation	7
Security guarantees for Ukraine	9
Maritime cooperation	10
Economic, trade and energy cooperation	13
Justice and accountability	15
Cooperation on Foreign Information Manipulation and interference	16
Conclusion	17
Appendix 1: List of Members and declarations of interest	19
Appendix 2: List of witnesses	20
Appendix 3: Call for Evidence	22

SUMMARY

This report considers the following agreement, laid before Parliament in accordance with section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010:

- One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine (CP 1277)

The Agreement puts in place a legally binding framework for future cooperation between the UK and Ukraine. It covers a broad range of areas, from defence and maritime security to trade and investment, outlining key principles to structure their future cooperation. It is accompanied by a Political Declaration offering some more detail as to the types of activities which could take place under the Agreement.

We support the underlying rationale for the Agreement and welcome the UK's support for Ukraine. This could contribute to Ukraine's ability to deter future aggression. However, whilst the title raises expectations, the Agreement is actually expressed in very general terms and is lacking in detail. The Agreement restates the financial commitment of the UK to the Ukraine at least until 2030/31. There is an important interaction between this Agreement and a wider question of security guarantees. Our report focuses on aspects of this Partnership that we feel could deliver for the UK. However, in order for any benefits to be realised, a clear and realistic roadmap will have to be put in place to deliver them. This roadmap is currently lacking.

We welcome the emphasis we heard from the Government on working with Ukrainian counterparts on governance issues and support for the rule of law in Ukraine. We see this work as a vital prerequisite to a mutually beneficial investment and innovation relationship. We ask the Government to provide Parliament with greater detail as to how this work will be facilitated under the auspices of this Partnership.

The Partnership includes commitments for the UK to continue to support the actions of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court in pursuit of accountability for crimes committed during the conflict in Ukraine. We recognise the challenges this will present and ask the Government to keep Parliament informed of progress.

Finally, we note that this Agreement was laid before Parliament in a highly uncertain geopolitical environment. We therefore propose that this Agreement be formally reviewed, in the event that Russia and Ukraine reach a peace settlement.

We call for a debate on this report due to heightened political interest in the events relating to Ukraine.

UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Agreement

AGREEMENT REPORTED FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION

1. The One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement (“the Agreement”) was laid before Parliament on 24 February 2025. The period for scrutiny under section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 expires on 28 March 2025. The Government was asked to extend the period for scrutiny as permitted by Section 21 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, to allow time for this report to be debated. As of the date of this report we have not received a response to this request.

Introduction

2. This Agreement was laid before Parliament in the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment as regards Ukraine’s future. The situation has continued to develop and has moved substantially even in the period between our taking evidence and the publication of this report.
3. The Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister and President Zelensky on 16 January 2025 in Kyiv. It provides a long-term framework under which cooperation between the UK and Ukraine can take place across a range of sectors.¹ Article 1 provides for defence cooperation. Article 2 contains a commitment to continue to build consensus on NATO membership for Ukraine, and Article 3 introduces a maritime partnership to secure freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, Azov Sea and Baltic Sea. The remaining articles outline cooperation in a range of areas, including improving the economic and trade relationship, cooperation on energy and the green transition, combatting misinformation, and ensuring justice and accountability for crimes under international law.²
4. The obligations contained in the Agreement are expressed in very general and aspirational terms. Slightly more detail is included in the accompanying non-binding Political Declaration. In this report, we focus on aspects of the Agreement which we feel have some potential to deliver benefits, or are potentially consequential for the UK. We stress that in order for any such benefits to be realised, a clear and realistic roadmap will have to be put in place to deliver on these benefits. This roadmap is currently lacking.
5. We open with a brief discussion of the background to this Agreement. We then turn to a consideration of the title, duration and associated purpose. Next, we discuss the defence cooperation articles in the Agreement. We heard that the UK can learn from Ukraine’s experience in developing

1 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *Explanatory Memorandum on the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (February 2025). https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F67b87173ff9676313f3533c2%2FEM_CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership.odt&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK [accessed 14 March 2025]

2 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

defence technologies, such as AI assisted drones, and developments in the energy sphere.

6. At the time of writing, Ukraine's future security and defence situation is uncertain, as the US has initiated a process to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. We will address the relationship between this aspect of the Agreement and (at present) open questions around security guarantees for Ukraine. This is currently a rapidly moving picture. As such, we consider the potential for the Agreement to support Ukraine in developing an effective deterrent against future aggression, and discuss any risks to the UK. The report will consider the maritime security partnership envisaged in the Agreement, along with the opportunities and risks as we see them.
7. The report then considers the economic, trade and energy cooperation contained in the Agreement, as well as exchanges in science, innovation and technology. We discuss the need for a stable environment for investment in Ukraine. An important prerequisite as we see it will be to support Ukraine in developing good governance, transparency around processes such as public procurement, and robust respect for the rule of law.³ Building and developing the rule of law is an area where the United Kingdom has the skills and experience to make a material contribution to the stability of Ukraine.
8. Finally, we will address issues around justice and accountability, and combatting foreign information manipulation and interference.
9. In considering this Agreement the Committee was constrained by the time limits in the CRAG process. We took evidence from four expert witnesses from the UK and Ukraine, representing a range of views and perspectives on it. We would like to thank them for their contributions. We would also like to thank Stephen Doughty MP, Minister for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories in the FCDO, for his evidence in support of our scrutiny of this Agreement.
10. Pursuant to its usual practice, the Committee issued a call for evidence. Written evidence submitted pursuant to that request is generally published on the Committee's website. The Committee reserves the right not to publish certain information, for example, where it is submitted anonymously. The Committee will, nonetheless, in accordance with its duty, consider all such evidence. We received a number of written submissions, all from individuals. We note that many of these expressed largely similar concerns about the UK's support for Ukraine, and were not in favour of the Agreement. We note that these objections related predominantly to the financial cost to the UK of providing support to Ukraine, and to UK support for NATO membership for Ukraine, due to concerns that such measures could further escalate tensions with Russia. For the avoidance of any doubt, the publication of evidence does not amount to an endorsement of the views expressed.
11. We report the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement to the House for special attention and debate, in light of the heightened political interest in events in Ukraine and the UK-Ukraine relationship.

3 [QQ 14-16, 23](#) (Stephen Doughty)

Background

12. The Agreement builds on the 2020 Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement, based closely on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and a non-binding ten-year Security Cooperation Agreement (SCA) signed by the UK and Ukraine in January 2024. The SCA was signed further to a G7 commitment to provide long-term security guarantees to Ukraine, to be set out on a bilateral basis.⁴ The G7 commitments focused on helping Ukraine to develop sustainable forces capable of defending the country, deterring future aggression, and on providing assistance in the event of future aggression.⁵ The UK reiterated these commitments in the SCA.⁶ These arrangements do not, however, amount to a NATO-style collective defence guarantee. Such a guarantee is beyond the scope of this “100 Year Partnership Agreement”.
13. The UK has rightly developed a closer relationship with Ukraine following the illegal invasion by Russia of Ukraine.⁷ The Explanatory Memorandum sets out that the 100 Year Partnership Agreement “reflects a broadening and deepening of the UK’s relationship with Ukraine, in part reflecting the closer engagement between the two countries since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022.”⁸ The UK has been one of the leading donors to Ukraine. In total, since 2022, the UK has committed to providing £12.8 billion for Ukraine, of which £7.8 billion is in military support and £5 billion is in non-military support.⁹

The Agreement

14. The ‘One Hundred Year Partnership’ comprises two instruments:
 - (1) a legally binding Agreement called the ‘One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement’ with 14 articles covering a range of areas, from defence capabilities to economic and cultural ties.
 - (2) a non-binding Political Declaration, comprising 11 Pillars, each of which corresponds to an article in the Agreement. These outline a range of activities to take place under the Agreement.

4 G7, *Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine* (12 July 2023): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1169579/Joint_Declaration_of_Support_for_Ukraine.pdf [accessed 17 March 2025]

5 G7, *Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine* (12 July 2023): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1169579/Joint_Declaration_of_Support_for_Ukraine.pdf [accessed 17 March 2025]

6 Number 10 Downing Street, *Agreement on Security Cooperation between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine* (12 January 2024): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf [accessed 17 March 2025]

7 The Charter of the United Nations makes clear that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

8 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *Explanatory Memorandum on the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (February 2025). https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F67b87173ff9676313f3533c2%2FEM_CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership.odt&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK [accessed 14 March 2025]

9 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *Policy Paper: UK Support to Ukraine: Factsheet* (28 February 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-support-to-ukraine-factsheet/uk-support-to-ukraine-factsheet#sanctions> [accessed 17 March 2025]

15. The Agreement contains a range of articles setting out provisions for cooperation across defence and security issues, economic and trade issues, science and technology, and the socio-cultural sphere.

The purpose and duration of the Agreement

16. The scope of the Agreement is so broad that we felt it merited some investigation as to its purpose. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Agreement says that it offers a legal framework governing cooperation between the UK and Ukraine.¹⁰ Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, told us that the Agreement reflects a “fundamental change” in the context and depth of the UK-Ukraine relationship. He viewed the Agreement as a way to support Ukraine’s resilience and to promote good governance, alongside cooperation on defence and security matters.¹¹
17. Hanna Hopko, co-founder of the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory, told us that the Agreement “represents a historic milestone” in the UK-Ukraine relationship, “solidifying bilateral strategic partnership at an unprecedented level for generations to come.”¹² She said that the Agreement was “really important” as a “powerful sign that Ukraine has a strong partnership”.¹³ Similarly, Simon Smith, Chairman of the Steering Group on the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House, told us that he considered that one of the important aspects of the Agreement is to “take the lead in showing the kind of agreement that could be made”, and Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said that the Agreement itself “establishes intent and commitment” and situates the partnership with Ukraine as a “significant pillar” within European security.¹⁴ However, we also heard from Professor David Betz, Professor of War in the Modern World at King’s College London, that the value of the agreement is “nugatory” and that it was notable chiefly for its 100-year duration.¹⁵
18. The question as to its purpose is particularly relevant given the duration of the partnership. As indicated by the title, the Agreement is ostensibly intended to be in place for 100 years. Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories at the FCDO, told us that “some of our longest-term and most stable relationships are based on these types of ambitious agreements and commitments.”¹⁶ However, some witnesses suggested that an Agreement of this duration was not meaningful. Professor Betz told us that he found the commitment to 100 years “not credible”,¹⁷ while Simon Smith said that he did not consider this “the most impressive part of the treaty”. Mr Smith further observed that this aspect

10 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *Explanatory Memorandum on the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (February 2025). https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F67b87173ff9676313f3533c2%2FEM_CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership.odt&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK [accessed 14 March 2025]

11 [QQ 14, 23](#) (Stephen Doughty)

12 [Q 1](#) (Hanna Hopko)

13 [Q 1](#) (Hanna Hopko)

14 [Q 1](#) (Simon Smith), [Q 1](#) (Nick Childs)

15 [Q 1](#) (Professor David Betz)

16 [Q 14](#) (Stephen Doughty)

17 [Q 2](#) (Professor David Betz)

of the Agreement “does not seem like the best idea” if it “distracts attention from the content and substance of the Agreement.”¹⁸

19. We also note that under Article 12(3) of the Agreement either party can terminate the Partnership by giving six months’ notice, so the notion of a “100 Year Partnership” may be somewhat illusory.
20. **We welcome efforts to contribute to a secure and peaceful Ukraine. However, we note that the value of this Agreement appears to lie primarily in its signalling function, and we are concerned by the lack of detail on the substance of the Agreement.**
21. **We welcome the Government’s stated aim for the Partnership to provide stability and structure to an enduring UK-Ukraine relationship. But we found merit in the argument we heard from witnesses that the title is rather meaningless, and risks distracting attention from the substance of the Partnership.**

Defence and security cooperation

22. Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement contain obligations to cooperate in the field of defence, including by developing joint defence and industrial capabilities, strengthening Ukraine’s defence procurement, and developing joint production of defence products by transferring technologies.¹⁹ There is an emphasis on strengthening intellectual property rights around transferred technologies to support innovation.²⁰ There is also a commitment to building consensus around NATO membership for Ukraine.
23. The Political Declaration accompanying the Agreement provides greater detail as to what is intended under these articles. Pillar 1 envisages creating rapid response mechanisms, joint use of military formations and other specialised structures to provide mutual defence and security services. It sets out ambitions jointly to produce and develop advanced weapons and ammunition manufacturing capabilities, to deepen cooperation on long-range strike capabilities, and to integrate air and missile defence and complex weapons stockpiles.²¹ It reiterates the Government’s previous commitment to provide Ukraine with £3 billion in annual military assistance until 2030/2031 and for as long as needed to support Ukraine.²²
24. Pillar 2 contains a reiteration of the commitment in the 2024 SCA to provide consultation and support in the event of an armed attack. It commits to modernising Ukraine’s National Security Architecture, cooperation to develop cyber capabilities, cooperation on serious and organised crime, and

18 Q 2 (Simon Smith)

19 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

20 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

21 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

22 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

to protect critical national infrastructure.²³ It commits the UK to working with other NATO members to advance Ukraine’s membership aspirations.²⁴

25. We note that some risks to defence cooperation of this kind were shared with us in evidence, particularly in view of the developing geopolitical situation. Professor David Betz in particular felt that the UK’s contributions to the defence of Ukraine create “significant opportunity costs for our own military readiness” which he found “hard to justify”.²⁵ His assertion was made on the basis that the UK has “no direct national interest” in Ukraine.²⁶ Simon Smith countered this point by suggesting that it is in the UK’s national interest to propose solutions to the rise of “Putinism” where “decisions are taken by larger countries at the expense of smaller countries.”²⁷ He suggested that the Agreement presents “some examples of what we can do”.²⁸ A written submission from Professor Alistair Miskimmon and Professor Ben O’Loughlin argued that the UK “gains status and solidarity” by being a lead ally and partner with Ukraine as a liberal democracy”, and that the Agreement contributes to the UK’s national interest in terms of “soft power”.²⁹ It symbolises, they argue, the UK’s commitment to liberal democracy, international law and principles of sovereignty.³⁰
26. Other witnesses conceded that the resources committed to are significant, but the Agreement could offer some mutual benefits, “potentially significant”, in the areas of future defence and security capabilities and industrial base issues for the UK.³¹ For example, Hanna Hopko told us that Ukraine’s capability to produce new military technologies is steadily increasing, and that the UK stands to benefit from this development.³² However, at present there is insufficient detail in the Agreement and Declaration to allow us to understand how these benefits can be realised. Simon Smith said he would like to see “something more concrete” added to the Agreement in the field of defence industrial cooperation, including an indication as to specific projects or objectives, as well as “some description” as to how these mechanisms would work, and how their operation might be guaranteed by both sides.³³ We would urge the Government to develop more concrete plans on how effective cooperation between the UK and Ukraine on defence and industrial base issues could operate. We welcome the evidence we subsequently received in correspondence from the Minister setting out opportunities across a range of sectors, including energy, defence, infrastructure and construction, for UK businesses.³⁴

23 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

24 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

25 [Q 1](#) (Professor David J Betz)

26 [Q 1](#) (Professor David J Betz)

27 [Q 4](#) (Simon Smith)

28 [Q 4](#) (Simon Smith)

29 Professor Alistair Miskimmon and Professor Ben O’Loughlin ([UKR0016](#))

30 Professor Alistair Miskimmon and Professor Ben O’Loughlin ([UKR0016](#))

31 [QQ 1, 6](#) (Nick Childs)

32 [Q 3](#) (Hanna Hopko)

33 [Q 5](#) (Simon Smith)

34 Letter from Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and UK Overseas Territories, to the Chair (25 March 2025): <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47264/documents/244946/default/>

27. ***We welcome this explanation, and we ask the Government to provide detail as to how the activities outlined in Pillars 1 and 2 of the Political Declaration are likely to be undertaken, to what timeline, and reassurance as to what benefit they will provide to the UK.***
28. On the question of NATO membership, the Political Declaration reiterates the Government’s commitment to Ukraine’s “irreversible path to membership”.³⁵ It focuses on working through the NATO Ukraine Council to support reform efforts, and to ensure interoperability of Ukraine’s security and defence forces with NATO standards. All NATO members must agree on the question of accession, that there are ongoing uncertainties around the position of the US in respect of the alliance generally, and that the US, in particular, has stated that it no longer views Ukrainian membership of NATO as a realistic prospect.
29. **We support any efforts to ensure that Ukraine’s capabilities are interoperable with our NATO allies. We support Ukraine’s reform efforts in pursuit of NATO membership.**

Security guarantees for Ukraine

30. At the NATO summit in July 2023, Ukraine sought firmer commitments on the future of its membership of the alliance, and security guarantees from its members.³⁶ As noted in the paragraph 12 of this report, in July 2023, G7 members issued a declaration on security guarantees for Ukraine outside the NATO setting.³⁷ These commitments were subsequently reiterated in the 2024 UK-Ukraine Security Cooperation Agreement. The question of security guarantees became still more prominent in early 2025, when the US initiated peace talks in an attempt to bring the Russia-Ukraine conflict to an end.
31. There is an important question as to whether or not this Agreement could serve as a deterrent to future Russian aggression. In this context, witnesses discussed the contribution that this Agreement makes to deterrence. There was broad agreement that the Agreement alone does not offer a deterrent.³⁸ Professor Betz, in particular, said that the Agreement “does not represent anything to Russia that it will regard as truly deterring in the future.”³⁹ However, others took into account the contribution which this Agreement could make to the overall relationship, and commented that this Agreement could help to “maintain, increase and improve, through cooperative agreement, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.”⁴⁰ Nick Childs pointed in particular to the maritime partnership as “potentially very significant”—though he also highlighted some risks in the level of UK commitment in this area (further explored in the section below).⁴¹ Simon Smith said that while the Agreement itself is “not a deterrent”, it “enables a lot of actions and

35 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

36 House of Commons Library, *Security Guarantees to Ukraine*, Research Briefing, [Number 9837](#), July 2024

37 G7, *Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine* (12 July 2023): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1169579/Joint_Declaration_of_Support_for_Ukraine.pdf [accessed 17 March 2025]

38 [Q 13](#) (Nick Childs, Simon Smith)

39 [Q 13](#) (Professor David Betz)

40 [Q 13](#) (Nick Childs)

41 [Q 13](#) (Nick Childs)

cooperation” which, taken with other measures, could provide an effective deterrent in the future to underpin a security guarantee.⁴²

32. The Minister told us in evidence that there is an “important interaction” between this Agreement and a wider question of security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a settlement between Russia and Ukraine.⁴³ The Government’s position is that any settlement between Russia and Ukraine must be backed by a security guarantee, to which the UK will contribute. The Minister confirmed the Government’s position that a security guarantee must include a US backstop.⁴⁴
33. The Minister highlighted the value of this Agreement in equipping Ukraine to defend itself, and to deterring future aggression. This must involve “training, equipping and building up Ukraine’s long-term capability.”⁴⁵ The Agreement, according to the Minister, puts in place the “practical commitments” to do this.⁴⁶ He similarly pointed to the commitment contained in the treaty for a maritime security partnership as an example of a practical step that could build up Ukraine’s deterrence.⁴⁷ He told us that “the immediate package of security guarantees” currently being discussed is a piece of work “distinct” from this Agreement, but that the Agreement “locks into it very neatly.”⁴⁸
34. **We note that the Agreement establishes a framework to facilitate greater cooperation in areas critical to the future defence capabilities of Ukraine. We welcome the Government’s aim that this Agreement, alongside other measures, should offer a framework to build an effective deterrence to future Russian aggression. *In the event of some sort of agreement between Ukraine and Russia, we recommend that the Government undertake a formal review of the arrangements set out in the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and Declaration, to ensure it is appropriate to, and compatible with, any outcome. We suggest that the Government, in any event, keep this Agreement under review to ensure that it is utilised in an effective, resource efficient manner, while also keeping in mind risks to the UK.***

Maritime cooperation

35. One of the more substantive articles of the Agreement (Article 3) concerns the development of a maritime security partnership with Ukraine, with the aim of strengthening the security and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, Azov Sea and Baltic Sea.⁴⁹ The Political Declaration further says that the Partnership aims to ensure the “speedy restoration of Ukraine’s control

42 [Q 13](#) (Simon Smith)

43 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

44 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty). A US ‘backstop’ broadly speaking refers to the idea that the US would commit to providing military or intelligence assistance in the event of future conflict in Ukraine. The exact nature of this assistance is not yet clearly defined.

45 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

46 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

47 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

48 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

49 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

over all temporarily occupied territories and strengthen its potential as a powerful maritime and riverine state.”⁵⁰

36. According to the Political Declaration, this is to be achieved in part via deepening operational cooperation between the UK and Ukraine, including in joint task groupings (or ‘flotillas’). This involves the Royal Navy playing a “core role in regional security”, in particular in helping support Ukraine in protecting its critical maritime infrastructure. The Political Declaration sets out the aspiration for the UK and Ukraine to cooperate to build a balanced maritime force, on maritime training initiatives, interoperability with NATO in the maritime sphere, and on a partnership on de-mining operations.
37. The Declaration is not always clear which activities it sets out under the maritime partnership are new, and which replicate or “build on” existing cooperation. For example, the Political Declaration says that the UK and Ukraine will “maximise the benefits” of training initiatives which currently take place under the Maritime Capability Coalition (a coalition the UK and Norway lead to provide training and equipment to Ukraine), and continue to fund humanitarian mine action. It says that the UK will “help to develop innovative finance mechanisms” to raise additional funds to support humanitarian mine action, and that the UK will “continue to work with Ukraine” on de-mining operations.⁵¹ **In order to assess the depth of this new maritime security partnership, it would be helpful to understand what additional support will be offered, and in what way this will build on existing arrangements.**
38. The Minister told us that in the immediate term, the UK will be providing “force-generation training” for the Ukrainian Mine Countermeasure Taskforce.⁵² In the longer term, the aim of Article 3 is to facilitate cooperation on the security and stability of the Black Sea.⁵³ The Minister told us that the maritime partnership is “specifically about equipping Ukraine to protect its own assets and operations in line with international law” and that the Government wants to “work with Ukraine closely on dealing with mines in the Black Sea and other risks to future civilian and military navigation.”⁵⁴ Ultimately, he felt that the maritime partnership “sends a very important signal more broadly and globally” about the UK’s support for the “functioning of the multilateral system and international rules-based order when it comes to the maritime domain.”⁵⁵
39. Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, characterised the maritime aspect of the UK-Ukrainian relationship as a “core” element of the partnership up to this point.⁵⁶ Mr Childs told us that even prior to the 2022 invasion, there had been “a lot of focus” on maritime security, and that this

50 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

51 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

52 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

53 [Q 17](#) (Stephen Doughty)

54 [Q 18](#) (Stephen Doughty)

55 [Q 18](#) (Stephen Doughty)

56 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

had incrementally increased over time.⁵⁷ We heard that the Ukrainian navy lost 75% of its capability in the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea. Since this point, it has not operated as a conventional force, and has mostly relied on unconventional tactics in the Black Sea, for example by using uncrewed surface vessels, and using long-range strikes on ships in port.⁵⁸ The UK's support for Ukraine in this field has mostly aimed to build Ukraine's capabilities in accordance with Ukraine's needs to patrol and protect its territorial waters. This has involved a "mosquito fleet" of smaller ships.⁵⁹ The Government has confirmed that, to date, the UK has provided over £265 million in support of Ukraine's maritime capability, funded from the annual funding pool of military support. Future funding for the maritime partnership is intended to come from the £3 billion annual commitment of military support to Ukraine.⁶⁰

40. Nick Childs stressed that one important argument in favour for this support is the need to secure a safe navigation corridor for grain in the Black Sea.⁶¹ However, while the UK's existing support in this sphere aims to help Ukraine develop a naval capability tailored to its need to patrol and protect its territorial waters, he also warned that "if it is part of the UK's ambition to contribute, with Ukraine, to delivering a more stable general maritime situation in the Black Sea, that is going to require significant resources in terms of patrolling presence."⁶²
41. Mr Childs also highlighted some potential risks associated with this support. In particular, the reference to the Azov Sea in the Agreement could prove problematic in light of Russia's claim to this Sea as internal waters in view of its current occupation of eastern parts of Ukraine.⁶³ Mr Childs warned that including the Azov Sea implies "reversing [of] those occupations of Crimea and the Sea of Azov coast" and that this "does not look feasible at the moment or at any time in the near future, given the mood music around the current negotiations."⁶⁴ Professor Betz highlighted the need to be "realistic" about the future shape of a peace agreement and to act pragmatically.⁶⁵ Mr Childs warned that the UK's involvement in this region does carry the risk of being involved in "significant territorial flashpoints".⁶⁶ He also stressed that cooperation of this kind is likely to be resource intensive if the UK is to deliver "a more stable general maritime situation in the Black Sea".⁶⁷
42. We recognise the need for Ukraine to have the capability to defend its territory. In line with the Government's ambitions that the UK support Ukraine in this regard, we understand that this may include cooperation in the naval and maritime sphere. However, we stress that these plans will be affected by events that, at time of writing, are yet to unfold. **We emphasise that any maritime and naval support should contribute to the overall security**

57 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

58 [Q 8](#) (Nick Childs)

59 [Q 8](#) (Nick Childs)

60 Letter from Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and UK Overseas Territories, to the Chair (25 March 2025): <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47264/documents/244946/default/>

61 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

62 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

63 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

64 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

65 [Q 7](#) (Professor David J Betz)

66 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

67 [Q 7](#) (Nick Childs)

of the region. Proceeding with the maritime security partnership should be undertaken following appropriate risk assessments.

43. *The maritime security partnership should be swiftly reviewed in the event of an agreement between Ukraine and Russia. We ask the Government to share with Parliament at that time any revised priorities for the maritime partnership.*

Economic, trade and energy cooperation

44. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the Agreement “provides a framework to build enduring links in support of the UK’s growth, development, and security objectives.”⁶⁸ This aspiration was reiterated in evidence to us by the Minister, who said that his main priorities for the Agreement, beyond the immediate security of Ukraine, lay in the “growth and economic space” to build “business-to-business links, and investment” and to create “a better climate in Ukraine for UK investment, and joint ventures.”⁶⁹ This section particularly considers those articles of the Agreement which deal with economic and trade cooperation (Article 4), cooperation on energy and climate (Article 5) and on science, innovation and technology (Article 8). We stress that there is a need for further work to ensure that the necessary legal and commercial architecture is in place to support these activities.
45. Article 4 of the Agreement requires the Parties to strengthen conditions for investment and cooperation across a range of sectors, from transport to infrastructure.⁷⁰ The Political Declaration sets out that this involves improving utilisation of the UK-Ukraine Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement and UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement, removing barriers to trade, establishing business-to-business partnerships and supporting the development of Ukraine’s financial centre and business environment through sustained UK business access. It also proposes supporting Ukraine’s public procurement regime by promoting transparency and accountability, including in recovery and reconstruction projects.⁷¹ We acknowledge the reference in the Minister’s letter to removing trade barriers and improving the UK business experience in Ukraine.⁷² We welcome these provisions encouraging a free and open economy.
46. The Political Declaration proposes using UK Export Finance to support priority infrastructure and defence projects, for example the reconstruction of bridges in Kyiv. It also envisages increased cooperation on food security

68 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *Explanatory Memorandum on the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (February 2025). https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F67b87173ff9676313f3533c2%2FEM_CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership.odt&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK [accessed 14 March 2025]

69 [Q 16](#) (Stephen Doughty)

70 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

71 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

72 Letter from Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and UK Overseas Territories, to the Chair (25 March 2025): <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47264/documents/244946/default/>

and agricultural development, and co-developing a database to verify grain shipments (the Grain Verification Scheme) to identify grain theft by Russia.⁷³

47. Article 5 of the Agreement says that the Parties will cooperate on a clean energy transition.⁷⁴ The Political Declaration suggests that this will include exploring projects on renewable energy sources to attract British investment, collaboration on low carbon hydrogen production, storage and transport, supporting projects to close mines, and supporting the development of a critical minerals strategy in Ukraine.⁷⁵ Finally, it includes references to cooperation on nuclear energy supply and green steel production. We note that some of these issues, particularly around critical minerals, are the subject of ongoing discussion. It is perhaps surprising that there is not more in this Agreement on critical minerals.
48. Article 8 of the Agreement expresses a broad commitment to cooperate in the field of science, technology and innovation.⁷⁶ Pillar 8 of the Political Declaration fleshes out the nature of this collaboration. It includes developing capabilities in the use of critical technologies, for example digital infrastructure and communications, space, and, in particular, building on the expertise developed by Ukraine in the area of AI assisted drone technology.⁷⁷ These activities are to be supported by greater cooperation in the field of research and innovation, including by delivering “mutually beneficial” joint programmes between commercial bodies, universities and research centres.⁷⁸
49. We are interested in the evidence we heard that the UK could benefit from the experiences of Ukraine, for example in its development of drone capabilities and other defence technologies.⁷⁹ Hanna Hopko told us that “30% of the weapons used by the defence forces of Ukraine are produced in Ukraine”⁸⁰ and that Ukraine is steadily building its capacity to produce new military technologies. Ukraine produces more than 1 million drones per year, and is improving production of its own missile systems.⁸¹ Ukraine is experienced in the area of electronic warfare and in this sense, Ms Hopko noted that it is a contributor to European security.⁸² Nick Childs concurred that “there is a lot Ukraine has learned and can teach us ... including drone warfare” that

73 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

74 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

75 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

76 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

77 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

78 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

79 [Q 3](#) (Hanna Hopko), [Q 6](#) (Nick Childs), [Q 15](#) (Stephen Doughty)

80 [Q 3](#) (Hanna Hopko)

81 [Q 3](#) (Hanna Hopko)

82 [Q 3](#) (Hanna Hopko)

the UK has not “learned how to do ourselves”⁸³ The Minister confirmed to us that Ukraine has identified “new areas for cooperation” in defence technologies, new capabilities and in the science and energy sectors.⁸⁴

50. In view of these mutually beneficial opportunities to cooperate in these spheres, we welcome statements from the Minister that the UK continues to work with Ukraine on governance, rule of law and anti-corruption issues.⁸⁵ We heard that this Agreement offers a framework to further support this work.⁸⁶ The Minister told us that beyond the immediate security and defence needs, the Agreement aims to develop the economic relationship, to “benefit trade, develop business-to-business links and investment” and to create a “better climate in Ukraine for UK investment” and joint ventures.⁸⁷ We also heard from the Minister that support for the rule of law, governance and anti-corruption reforms are “crucial” and that the Government is seeking to deepen cooperation on these issues.⁸⁸ He told us that he had met with agencies in Ukraine responsible for reforms on these issues.⁸⁹
51. **We stress that a stable environment for mutually beneficial innovation and growth is contingent on good governance and the rule of law, as well as well-policed public procurement. We were encouraged by the Minister’s evidence that the Government is deepening cooperation on these issues. We encourage the Government to continue to work closely with their Ukrainian counterparts on governance reforms and strengthening the rule of law. We would welcome greater detail in the context of this treaty as to how the Government intends to continue this work, and how this Agreement affects the progress of any initiatives. We ask the Government to update us on progress made in this area.**
52. **We suggest that the Government consider structuring aid to Ukraine and cooperation under this partnership so as to best promote and strengthen the rule of law and support the development of good governance principles. We ask the Government to indicate its priority areas so that UK science, technology and industry can start to work in achieving meaningful cooperation.**

Justice and accountability

53. Article 6 of the Agreement stipulates that the UK and Ukraine will deepen collaboration in the criminal and civil spheres, enhance sanctions cooperation, and take steps to pursue the accountability of states “that commit gross violations of international law.”⁹⁰ The Political Declaration further confirms that this includes cooperating to ensure that Russia is held accountable “for

83 Q 6 (Nick Childs)

84 Q 15 (Stephen Doughty)

85 Q 16 (Stephen Doughty)

86 Q 14 (Stephen Doughty)

87 Q 16 (Stephen Doughty)

88 QQ 14–16, 23 (Stephen Doughty)

89 QQ 15–16 (Stephen Doughty)

90 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

the crime of aggression and atrocities committed in Ukraine”.⁹¹ The Political Declaration says that the UK and Ukraine will, as well as establishing a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression in Ukraine, support actions by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court.⁹²

54. We note that the situation in Ukraine has been referred to the International Criminal Court which is now investigating the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on the territory of Ukraine since 2013. Arrest warrants have been issued in relation to the unlawful deportation and the transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The ICC does not have jurisdiction to investigate allegations that Russia committed the crime of aggression in relation to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As a result, a Core Group of 41 states, including the UK, is working with Ukraine to establish a Special Tribunal to pursue this.⁹³
55. The Minister confirmed the Government’s commitment to ensuring “legally sound and valid processes to enable prosecutions to take place.”⁹⁴ He reiterated the Government’s position that “Russia has to pay for the damage it has done to Ukraine” and that “there has to be justice as part of any lasting and sustainable peace.”⁹⁵ He highlighted that the Government continues to “work with others in a group on the crime of aggression”, including on a loss and damage register within the Council of Europe, to properly account for the damage done by Russia to property and infrastructure.⁹⁶
56. **We welcome the Government’s commitment to pursuing accountability for crimes committed during the conflict in Ukraine, in particular through its support for the efforts of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General and the ICC. We recognise the challenges this will present and ask the Government to keep Parliament informed of progress.**

Cooperation on Foreign Information Manipulation and interference

57. Article 7 of the Agreement deals with Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference by establishing and developing cooperation on this topic.⁹⁷ We heard that existing cooperation is already strong in this area, and that the UK stands to learn from Ukraine’s experience in this area. Hanna Hopko noted that four strategic communications dialogues have taken place since 2022, between the Ukrainian Government strategic communication representatives and the relevant FCDO and Cabinet Office teams, which

91 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

92 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

93 The UK was invited to join this core group of 42 countries by Ukraine in 2023. The group works to pursue criminal accountability for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For further information, see: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-uk-joins-core-group-dedicated-to-achieving-accountability-for-russias-aggression-against-ukraine> [accessed 18 March 2025]

94 [Q 19](#) (Stephen Doughty)

95 [Q 19](#) (Stephen Doughty)

96 [Q 19](#) (Stephen Doughty)

97 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine*, CP 1277 (16 January 2025): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67b871514ad141d9083533c4/CS_Ukraine_1.2025_One_Hundred_Year_Partnership_Agreement.pdf [accessed 14 March 2025]

had facilitated a number of joint projects.⁹⁸ Ms Hopko also drew attention to instances of what she termed Russian disinformation, particularly efforts to discredit Ukrainian reform attempts, and suggested that other countries stand to learn from these experiences. Ms Hopko concluded that: “This is a very serious issue, and we have to consider how to invest more resources in not allowing Russian strategic and foreign information manipulation and interference.”⁹⁹ We subsequently received a letter from the Minister outlining the extent of cooperation in this field, which includes regular analytic exchanges and UK support for strategic communication campaigns in Ukraine.¹⁰⁰ We welcome his assurances that the Government continues to monitor the impacts of this work, and note with interest the example of previous successful disruption of Russian attempts to undermine Ukrainian democracy.

58. The Political Declaration promises that the UK and Ukraine will establish “deeper institutional links” on the issue, including “regular analytical exchanges” and joint conferences with Ukraine’s strategic communication institutes, joint media initiatives, information sharing and a regular dialogue.¹⁰¹
59. **We commend the existing cooperation in this area, and support the further collaboration outlined in this Agreement. We ask that Parliament be kept informed as to future developments in this area.**

Conclusion

60. While we support the underlying aims of the Agreement, we are concerned at the lack of substance and detail. We also stress that this Agreement will be ratified in a highly uncertain geopolitical environment. We suggest that the Government formally reviews the arrangements in the event of a settlement between Russia and Ukraine, with a particular focus on the maritime security partnership. In any event, we ask the Government to provide Parliament with a clear and realistic roadmap as to how and when the activities on defence cooperation and maritime security will be undertaken. We welcome the reports by the Minister that the UK continues to work with Ukrainian counterparts on governance and rule of law issues. We hope that this work can prove beneficial to a closer economic and investment relationship between our two countries.
61. **We welcome the Government’s ongoing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its position on security guarantees and a US backstop, and its commitment to future domestic defence spending. We believe these steps will be vital to achieve successful implementation of the Agreement.**
62. We report this Agreement to the House for special attention and a debate, along with our comments in paragraphs 19, 20, 26, 28, 33, 36, 41, 42, 50, 51, 55 and 58. In accordance with our intention to have our report debated, we have asked the Government to extend the period for scrutiny as permitted

98 [QQ 12; 20](#) (Stephen Doughty)

99 [Q 12](#) (Hanna Hopko)

100 Letter from Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and UK Overseas Territories, to the Chair (25 March 2025): <https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47264/documents/244946/default/>

101 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration* (17 January 2025): <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration/uk-ukraine-100-year-partnership-declaration> [accessed 14 March 2025]

in Section 21 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, to allow sufficient time for the House to consider our report. As of the date of this report we have not received a response to this request.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members

Lord Anderson of Swansea
 Lord Boateng
 Lord Fox
 Lord German
 Lord Goldsmith KC (Chair)
 Lord Hannay of Chiswick
 Lord Howell of Guildford
 Baroness Lawlor
 Lord Marland
 Lord McDonald of Salford
 Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
 Baroness Verma

Declarations of Interest

Lord Anderson of Swansea
No relevant interests

Lord Boateng
Independent non-executive director, at the Ghana International Bank

Lord Fox
No relevant interests

Lord German
No relevant interests

Lord Goldsmith KC
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (International law firm), in which capacity he has acted for a former Ukrainian president

Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Member, advisory board of the Centre for European Reform
Member, European Leadership Network
Chair, European & International Analysts Group

Lord Howell of Guildford
No relevant interests

Baroness Lawlor
No relevant interests

Lord Marland
Director, Janspeed Technologies Ltd (manufacturer of motor parts)

Lord McDonald of Salford
No relevant interests

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
No relevant interests.

Baroness Verma
No relevant interests

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published online at <https://committees.parliament.uk/work/8955/ukraine-100-year-partnership-agreement/publications/> and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with *gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

Oral evidence in chronological order

- * Simon Smith (Chairman of the Steering Committee, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House) [QQ 1-13](#)
- * Prof. David J Betz (Professor of War in the Modern World at Kings College London) [QQ 1-13](#)
- * Hanna Hopko (Co-Founder at International Center at Ukraine Victory) [QQ 1-13](#)
- * Nick Childs (Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)) [QQ 1-13](#)
- * Stephen Doughty MP (Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories at Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office) [QQ 14-24](#)
- * Ben Greenwood (EECAD Deputy Director and Head of Ukraine Department at Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) [QQ 14-24](#)

Alphabetical list of all witnesses

- Ray Beecroft [UKR0012](#)
- Pat Bernstein [UKR0001](#)
- * Professor David J Betz (Professor of War in the Modern World at Kings College London) ([QQ 1-13](#))
- * Nick Childs (Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)) ([QQ 1-13](#))
- Pauline Crame [UKR0005](#)
- Siobhan Dillon [UKR0024](#)
- * Stephen Doughty MP (Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories at Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office) ([QQ 14-24](#))
- Dr Robert Evered [UKR0010](#)
- John Goss [UKR0006](#)

- * Ben Greenwood (EECAD Deputy Director and Head of Ukraine Department at Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) ([QQ 14-24](#))
Tom Griffith-Jones [UKR0022](#)
- * Hanna Hopko (Co-Founder at International Center at Ukraine Victory) ([QQ 1-13](#))
Dickon Jackson [UKR0023](#)
Bart Lakeman [UKR0027](#)
S Malins [UKR0007](#)
Ian Mcculloch [UKR0025](#)
Millard [UKR0002](#)
Professor Alister Miskimmon [UKR0016](#)
Clare O’Keefe [UKR0015](#)
Professor Ben O’Loughlin [UKR0016](#)
Reverend John Powell [UKR0003](#)
Karin Radicke [UKR0018](#)
- * Simon Smith (Chairman of the Steering Committee, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House) ([QQ 1-13](#))
Serena Stallard [UKR0019](#)
Stone [UKR0020](#)
Mark Symon [UKR0017](#)
Eugenie Verney [UKR0011](#)

APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

Aim of the inquiry

The International Agreements Committee is conducting a short inquiry into the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the UK and Ukraine.

This call for evidence is intended to seek expert input to inform our assessment of the Agreement. The Committee will consider the Partnership Agreement, and accompanying Political Declaration. We intend to publish our report within the Parliamentary scrutiny period of 21 sitting days as set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRaG Act).

This is a public call for written evidence to be submitted to the Committee. The deadline is 10 March 2025. You can follow the Committee's activity on Twitter @[hlintagreements](#).

All are welcome to respond to the Call for Evidence and there are no barriers to making a submission. Respondents are not obliged to respond to every question listed, and so may confine their response to their particular areas of interest or expertise as they find appropriate.

Diversity comes in many forms and hearing a range of different perspectives means that committees are better informed and can more effectively scrutinise public policy and legislation. Committees can undertake their role most effectively when they hear from a wide range of individuals, sectors or groups in society affected by a particular policy or piece of legislation. We encourage anyone with experience or expertise of an issue under investigation by a select committee to share their views with the committee, with the full knowledge that their views have value and are welcome.

Questions

The Committee is happy to receive submissions on any issues related to the subject of the inquiry but would particularly welcome submissions on the questions listed below.

You do not need to address every question.

Instructions on how to submit evidence are set out at the end of this document.

- (1) How does this Agreement contribute to the UK's national interest? Are there any risks to the UK?
- (2) What will materially change as a result of this treaty?
- (3) The Partnership comprises both a short, legally binding treaty, and a more detailed non-binding political declaration. What do you see as the role of these respective instruments, and the benefits and/or drawbacks of including greater detail in the political declaration?
- (4) The Partnership reaffirms the UK's support for Ukrainian membership of NATO. How likely is this aspiration in the current climate, and what more could the Government do to ensure this outcome?
- (5) The Agreement contains a commitment to establish a maritime partnership with Ukraine, with the aim of strengthening security in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Azov Sea. How do you expect this

partnership to operate in practice, and what are the benefits and risks to the UK?

- (6) How does this Agreement relate to the wider issues of security guarantees for Ukraine in relation to any cease fire arrangements between Russia and Ukraine or any settlement between those two parties?
- (7) To what extent will this Agreement act as an effective deterrent to any further Russian aggression against Ukraine?
- (8) Are there any other aspects of this treaty or political declaration that you consider notable or could have significant policy implications?